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Abstract: The multi-leader-follower game can be looked on as a generalization of the Nash
equilibrium problem and the Stackelberg game, which contains several leaders and a number
of followers. Recently, the multi-leader-follower game has been drawing more and more at-
tention, for example, in electricity power markets. However, when we formulate a general
multi-leader-follower game as a single-level game, it will give rise to a lot of problems, such as
the lack of convexity and the failure of constraint qualifications. In this paper, to get rid of these
difficulties, we focus on a class of multi-leader-follower games that satisfy some particular, but
still reasonable assumptions, and show that these games can be formulated as ordinary Nash
equilibrium problems, and then as variational inequalities. We establish some results on the
existence and uniqueness of a leader-follower Nash equilibrium. We also present illustrative
numerical examples from an electricity power market model.
keywords: Multi-leader-follower game · Nash equilibrium problem · variational inequality ·
deregulated electricity market model
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1 Introduction
Since introduced by Nash in [1, 2], the Nash equilibrium problem (NEP) has received a lot
of academic attention from more and more researchers. It also has been playing an essential
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role in many application areas of economics, engineering and science; see [3, 4].
The Stackelberg game, also called the single-leader-follower game, arises from the oligopolis-
tic competition. In a Stackelberg game, there is a distinctive player, called the leader, who op-
timizes the upper-level problem and a number of remaining players, called the followers, who
optimize the lower-level problems jointly. In particular, the leader can anticipate the response
of the followers, and then use this ability to select his optimal strategy. At the same time, each
follower selects her optimal strategy according to the strategies of the leader and the followers.
When dealing with more complex practical problems, such as a deregulated electricity mar-
ket, we have to consider the competition among several firms and a different type of agents.
The corresponding problem is called the multi-leader-follower game, which has several lead-
ers and followers. Each leader can also anticipate the response of the followers, and uses this
ability to select his strategy to compete with the other leaders. At the same time, each follower
selects his optimal strategy according to the strategies of all leaders as well as the other follow-
ers. We are particularly interested in the situation, where no player can improve his status by
changing his strategy unilaterally, which we call a leader-follower Nash equilibrium, or simply
a L/F Nash equilibrium.
The multi-leader-follower game has recently been studied by some researchers and used to
model several problems in applications. Pang and Fukushima [5] introduced a class of remedial
models for the multi-leader-follower game, that can be formulated as a generalized Nash equi-
librium problem (GNEP) with convexified strategy sets; they also proposed some oligopolis-
tic competition models in electricity power markets, that led to multi-leader-follower games.
Based on the strong stationarity conditions of each leader in a multi-leader-follower game,
Leyffer and Munson [6] derived a family of nonlinear complementarity problem (NCP), non-
linear programming problem, and mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC)
formulations of the multi-leader-follower game. They also reformulated the game as a square
nonlinear complementarity problem by imposing an additional restriction. Outrata [7] con-
verted a kind of multi-leader-follower games to the equilibrium problems with equilibrium con-
straints (EPECs) and presented some Karush-Kuhn-Tucher (KKT) type of necessary conditions
for equilibria. Sherali [8] considered a special multi-leader-follower game where each leader
anticipates the response explicitly by the aggregate follower reaction curve. He also showed
the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium of the game called generalized-Stackelberg-
Nash Cournot equilibrium, and then proposed a numerical approach to find a generalized-
Stackelberg-Nash Cournot equilibrium. Unlike the above deterministic multi-leader-follower
games, DeMiguel and Xu [9] considered a stochastic multi-leader-follower game. They intro-
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duced a new concept called stochastic multiple-leader Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot equilibrium
and showed the existence and uniqueness results under some assumptions. They proposed also
a numerical approach to seek the Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot equilibrium with a sample average
approximation method. Even with these efforts, we still have to face a lot of problems when
we deal with the multi-leader-follower game, because of the inherent difficulties such as the
lack of convexity and the failure of constraint qualifications.
In this paper, we consider a simplified multi-leader-follower game with one follower, which
still has wide applications; see [5,10,11]. Under some particular assumptions on the cost func-
tions of both leaders and follower, as well as the constraints in the follower’s problem, we show
that the game can be reduced to a NEP, which may further be reformulated as a variational in-
equality (VI). Moreover, under suitable assumptions, we establish the existence and uniqueness
of a L/F Nash equilibrium. We also consider an optimization reformulation of the VI and give
some conditions that guarantee a stationarity point of the optimization problem to be a L/F
Nash equilibrium. Finally, we present illustrative numerical examples of an electricity power
market that consists of two or three firms as the leaders and the independent system operator
(ISO) as the follower.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we collect some basic defi-
nitions and present some preliminary results that will be used later. In Section 3, we introduce
the particular multi-leader-follower game considered in the paper, and formulate it as a NEP.
In Section 4, we reformulate it as a VI and show some conditions that ensure the existence and
uniqueness of a L/F Nash equilibrium. In Sections 5 and 6, we give an application in an elec-
tricity power market, and show some illustrative numerical examples from this model. Finally,
in Section 7, we conclude the paper.
2 Preliminaries
We start this section with some notations. A function G : Rn → Rt is called a Ck function
iff it is k times continuously differentiable. The gradient ∇f(x) of a differentiable function
f : Rn → R is regarded as a column vector. Furthermore, we denote the n ×m (transposed)
Jacobian matrix of a differentiable function F : Rn → Rm at a given point x by ∇F (x). For a
real-valued function f(x, y) with the variable x ∈ Rn and y ∈ Rm, the partial gradients with
respect to x and y are denoted by ∇xf(x, y) ∈ Rn and ∇yf(x, y) ∈ Rm, respectively. The
partial Hessian matrix obtained by first differentiating with respect to y and then with respect
to x is written as the matrix ∇2yxf(x, y) ∈ Rm×n. A vector is regarded as a column vector.
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However, if a vector x is composed of several subvectors, x1, · · · , xn, it is denoted, for the sake
of notation, as (x1, · · · , xn) instead of ((x1)T , · · · , (xn)T )T , where T denotes transposition.
2.1 Multi-Leader-Follower Games with One Follower
In this subsection, we describe a multi-leader-follower game with one follower and define
the corresponding L/F Nash equilibrium. First, we introduce the NEP and the Nash equilib-
rium.
In a NEP, there are N players labelled by integers ν = 1, · · · , N . Player ν’s strategy is
denoted by the vector xν ∈ Rnν and his cost function θν(x) depends on the strategies of all
players, which are collectively denoted by the vector x ∈ Rn consisting of the subvectors
xν ∈ Rnν , ν = 1, · · · , N , and n = n1 + · · · + nN . Player ν’s strategy set Xν ⊆ Rnν
is independent of the strategies of the other players, which are denoted collectively by x−ν =
(x1, · · · , xν−1, xν+1, · · · , xN) ∈ Rn−nν . For every fixed, but arbitrary, player ν, x−ν ∈ X−ν :=∏N
ν′=1,ν′ 6=ν X
ν′ , which consists of all players’ strategies except player ν, player ν solves the




ν , x−ν) s.t. xν ∈ Xν , (1)
where we denote θν(x) = θν(xν , x−ν) to emphasize the role of xν in this problem. A strategy
tuple x∗ ≡ (x∗,ν)Nν=1 ∈ X ≡
∏N
ν=1X
ν is called a Nash Equilibrium (NE) iff for all ν =
1, · · · , N ,
θν(x
∗,ν , x∗,−ν) ≤ θν(xν , x∗,−ν), ∀xν ∈ Xν .
A typical multi-leader-follower game with N leaders and one follower can be described as
follows. Let Xν ⊆ Rnν denote the strategy set of leader ν, ν = 1, · · · , N . We assume that the
strategy set of each leader Xν be independent of the strategies of other rival leaders. We also
denote each leader’s objective function by θν(xν , x−ν , y), ν = 1, · · · , N , which is dependent
on his own strategy xν and all the other rival leader’s strategies denoted by x−ν ∈ X−ν ≡∏N
ν′=1,ν′ 6=ν X
ν′ and also on the follower’s strategy denoted by y.
Let γ(x, y) and K(x) denote, respectively, the follower’s objective function and strategy set,
which depend on the leaders’ strategy tuple x. For each given strategy tuple x of the leaders,




γ(x, y) s.t. y ∈ K(x).
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We denote the set of optimal solutions to this problem by Y (x). Now, we define the concept of
Nash equilibrium for the above multi-leader-follower game with N leaders and one follower.
Definition 2.1. A strategy tuple x∗ = (x∗,1, · · · , x∗,N) ∈ X of the leaders’ strategies is called
a L/F Nash equilibrium, where L/F means leader-follower, iff there exist N strategies of the
follower denoted by a tuple (y∗,1, · · · , y∗,N) such that y∗,ν ∈ Y (x∗), ν = 1, · · · , N , and





ν , x∗,−ν , yν) s.t. xν ∈ Xν , yν ∈ Y (xν , x∗,−ν).
Here, for each ν = 1, · · · , N , Y (xν , x∗,−ν) is the set of the follower’s optimal responses
anticipated by leader ν, when leader ν chooses strategy xν and the other leaders’ strategies x−ν
are fixed at x∗,−ν . The above definition of a L/F Nash equilibrium is based on the assumption
that leader ν optimizes his objective value by anticipating the follower’s response yν from the
response set Y (xν , x∗,−ν) optimistically. This definition for the multi-leader-follower game ex-
tends that of an optimistic Stackelberg game considerd by Lignola and Morgan [12]. Note that
the follower will actually choose his optimal strategy y∗ ∈ Y (x∗) responding to all leaders’
strategies x∗, which may be different from the optimistic anticipations yν by the leaders. How-
ever, such complication is completely avoided, when the follower’s optimal response Y (x) is a
singleton for any x, which is the case for the game we consider in Section 3 of this paper.
2.2 Variational Inequality
The variational inequality VI(S, F ) is to find a vector x∗ ∈ S such that
F (x∗)T (x− x∗) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ S,
where S ⊆ Rn is a nonempty, closed and convex set and F : Rn → Rn is a given function.
Here we assume the function F to be continuously differentiable. Applications of a varia-
tional inequality can be found in various areas, such as transportation systems, mechanics, and
economics; see [13, 14].
Suppose that the feasible set S can be represented as
S := {x ∈ Rn : h(x) = 0, g(x) ≤ 0},
where h : Rn → Rp is an affine function and g : Rn → Rm is a continuously differentiable
convex function. Then under a suitable constraint qualification, a solution x of VI(S, F ), along
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with some Lagrange multipliers µ ∈ Rp and λ ∈ Rm, satisfies the following KKT conditions:
F (x) +∇h(x)µ+∇g(x)λ = 0,
h(x) = 0,
g(x) ≤ 0, λ ≥ 0, λTg(x) = 0.
(2)
Conversely, if a triple (x, µ, λ) ∈ Rn+p+m satisfies (2), then x solves VI(S, F ). We call a
triple (x, µ, λ) ∈ Rn+p+m a KKT triple iff it satisfies the above KKT conditions. Moreover, the
corresponding x-vector is called a KKT point. For simplicity, when there is no possibility of
confusion, we shall often refer to a KKT triple simply as a KKT point.
The following definition will be useful in this paper.
Definition 2.2. Let X ⊆ Rn be a convex set. The mapping F : Rn → Rn is said to be
(a) monotone on X iff
[F (x)− F (y)]T (x− y) ≥ 0 ∀x, y ∈ X;
(b) strictly monotone on X iff
[F (x)− F (y)]T (x− y) > 0 ∀x, y ∈ X, x 6= y;
(c) strongly monotone on X with modulus α > 0 iff
[F (x)− F (y)]T (x− y) ≥ α‖x− y‖2 ∀x, y ∈ X.
Clearly, strong monotonicity implies strict monotonicity, and strict monotonicity implies
monotonicity. The following proposition shows the well known relations between these mono-
tonicity properties of F and the positive semidefiniteness or positive definiteness of the Jaco-
bian matrix ∇F (x) [15].
Proposition 2.1. Let mapping F : Rn → Rn be continuously differentiable and X ⊆ Rn be a
convex set. Then
(a) F is monotone on X if and only if the Jacobian matrix ∇F (x) is positive semidefinite for
all x ∈ X;
(b) F is strictly monotone on X if the Jacobian matrix ∇F (x) is positive definite for all
x ∈ X;
(c) F is strongly monotone on X if and only if the Jacobian matrix ∇F (x) is uniformly posi-
tive definite on X , which is equivalent to saying that the minimum eigenvalues of the symmetric
matrices ∇F (x) +∇F (x)T are bounded away from zero on X .
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As to the existence and uniqueness of a solution in the variational inequality, a number of
results are known. One of the most fundamental results relies on the compactness of the set X .
Other existence results can be obtained by imposing another condition, such as coerciveness of
the function F , instead of the compactness of X . On the other hand, under some monotonicity
assumptions on F , the following two results on the uniqueness of a solution can be presented
[16].
Proposition 2.2. If F is strictly monotone on S, and the VI(S, F ) has at least one solution,
then the solution is unique.
Proposition 2.3. If F is strongly monotone on S, then there exists a unique solution to the
VI(S, F ).
The following proposition shows a basic relation between the NEP and the VI [17].
Proposition 2.4. Consider the NEP where each player ν solves the optimization problem
(1). If each Xν is a nonempty, closed and convex subset of Rnν and, for each fixed x−ν ,
the function θν(xν , x−ν) is convex and continuously differentiable in xν , then a strategy tuple




Xν and F (x) ≡ (∇xνθν(x))Nν=1.
3 Multi-Leader-Follower Games with Special Structure
In this section, we concentrate on a multi-leader-follower game with the following special
structure:




ν , x−ν , y) := ων(xν , x−ν) + ϕν(xν , y)









subject to y ∈ Y .
Here, all functions are assumed to be C2 functions. In particular, each function ων : Rn → R
is convex with respect to the variable xν . Functions gν : Rnν → Rsν are all convex and
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hν : Rnν → Rtν are all affine. Functions ψ, ϕν and set Y are assumed to have the following
explicit representations:
ϕν(x




Y ≡ {y ∈ Rm|Ay + a = 0}.
Here, Dν ∈ Rnν×m, ν = 1, · · · , N, c ∈ Rm, and matrix B ∈ Rm×m is assumed to be symmet-
ric and positive definite. Moreover, A ∈ Rp×m, a ∈ Rp, and matrix A has full row rank. Note
that the strategy set of the follower’s problem Y is an affine subset of Rm.
Then the above multi-leader-follower game can be written as follows:




ν , x−ν) + (xν)TDνy










subject to Ay + a = 0.
In this game, the objective functions of N leaders and the follower contain some related
terms. Specifically, the second term of the objective function appears in the follower’s objective
function in the negated form. Therefore, the game partly contains a kind of zero-sum structure
between each leader and the follower. An application of such special multi-leader-follower
games will be presented with some illustrative numerical examples later.
In the remainder of the paper, for simplicity, we will mainly consider the following game
with two leaders, labelled I and II. The results presented below can be extended to the case of





I, xII) + (xI)TDIy





I, xII) + (xII)TDIIy







yTBy + cTy − (xI)TDIy − (xII)TDIIy
subject to Ay + a = 0.
Since the follower’s problem is a strictly convex quadratic programming problem with
equality constraints, it is equivalent to finding a pair (y, λ) ∈ Rm×p satisfying the following
KKT system of linear equations:
By + c− (DI)TxI − (DII)TxII + ATλ = 0,
Ay + a = 0.
(3)
Note that, under the given assumptions, a KKT pair (y, λ) exists uniquely for each (xI, xII) and
is denoted by (y(xI, xII), λ(xI, xII)). By direct calculations, we have
y(xI, xII) =−B−1c−B−1AT (AB−1AT )−1(a− AB−1c)
+ [B−1(DI)T −B−1AT (AB−1AT )−1AB−1(DI)T ]xI
+ [B−1(DII)T −B−1AT (AB−1AT )−1AB−1(DII)T ]xII,
λ(xI, xII) = (AB−1AT )−1(a− AB−1c) + (AB−1AT )−1AB−1(DI)TxI
+ (AB−1AT )−1AB−1(DII)TxII.
Substituting y(xI, xII) for y in the leaders’ problems, the leaders’ objective functions can be
rewritten as
ωI(x
I, xII) + (xI)TDIy = ωI(x






I, xII) + (xII)TDIIy = ωII(x





where G ∈ Rm×nI , H ∈ Rm×nII , and r ∈ Rm are given by
G = B−1(DI)T −B−1AT (AB−1AT )−1AB−1(DI)T ,
H = B−1(DII)T −B−1AT (AB−1AT )−1AB−1(DII)T ,
r = −B−1c−B−1AT (AB−1AT )−1(a− AB−1c).
Let the functions defined by (4) and (5) be denoted as ΘI : RnI+nII → R and ΘII : RnI+nII →
R, respectively. Then we can formulate the above multi-leader-follower game as the following
NEP, which we call the NEP(Θν , Xν)IIν=I, where X














subject to gII(xII) ≤ 0, hII(xII) = 0.
Remark 3.1. Instead of solving the KKT system (3) explicitly, we may leave it as additional
constraints in each leader’s problem. This results in a GNEP, which has attracted much attention
recently [5, 18].
4 Existence and Uniqueness of L/F Nash Equilibrium
In this section, we further reformulate the NEP(Θν , Xν)IIν=I derived in the previous section
as a variational inequality, and discuss the existence and uniqueness of a L/F Nash equilibrium.
Throughout this section, we assume the sets X I and X II are nonempty.
In the NEP(Θν , Xν)IIν=I, the Hessian matrices of the leaders’ objective functions are calcu-
lated as










where matrix P ∈ Rm×m is given by
P = I −B− 12AT (AB−1AT )−1AB− 12 .
Since P is a projection matrix, it is symmetric, idempotent, and positive semidefinite. By the
given assumption, functions ωI(xI, xII) and ωII(xI, xII) are both convex with respect to xI and
xII, respectively. Therefore the leaders’ objective functions in the NEP(Θν , Xν)IIν=I are both
convex with respect to xI and xII, respectively.
By Proposition 2.4, we can reformulate the NEP(Θν , Xν)IIν=I as the following variational
inequality denoted by the VI(X, F̂ ): Find a vector x∗ ∈ X := X I ×X II such that
F̂ (x∗)T (x− x∗) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X,
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where x = (xI, xII) ∈ RnI+nII , Xν = {xν : gν(xν) ≤ 0, hν(xν) = 0}, ν = I, II and the function





 ∇xIωI(xI, xII) +DIr + 2DIGxI +DIHxII
∇xIIωII(xI, xII) +DIIr +DIIGxI + 2DIIHxII
 . (6)
Here we notice that matrices DIG and DIIH are symmetric from the definitions of G and H ,
respectively.
The VI Lagrangian function is written as











where λ = (λI, λII) ∈ RsI+sII and µ = (µI, µII) ∈ RtI+tII . The Jacobin matrix ∇xL̂(x, µ, λ) of
the VI Lagrangian function with respect to x is written as
∇xL̂(x, µ, λ) =
 ∇2xIIωII(xI, xII) ∇2xIIxIωII(xI, xII)
∇2xIxIIωI(xI, xII) ∇2xIIωII(xI, xII)

+



































































































 are both positive semidef-





is also positive semidefinite.






is strictly monotone, and the NEP(Θν , Xν)IIν=I has at least one solution, then the solution is
unique.













is positive semidefinite. It then follows from the definitions of matrices G, H and P that the
function
F˜ (x) ≡





is monotone. By the given assumption, the function F̂ = F0+ F˜ is therefore strictly monotone.
Moreover, by Proposition 2.2, if the VI(X, F̂ ) has at least one solution, then the solution is
unique. In view of (6), this in turn implies that the NEP(Θν , Xν)IIν=I has a unique solution by
Proposition 2.4.
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Theorem 4.2. If the function F0 defined by (7) is strongly monotone, then the NEP(Θν , Xν)IIν=I
has a unique solution.
Proof. In a similar manner to the proof of Theorem 4.1, we can deduce that function F̂ =
F0 + F˜ is strongly monotone. Then, by Proposition 2.3, the VI(X, F̂ ) has a unique solution.
Hence, by Proposition 2.4, the NEP(Θν , Xν)IIν=I has a unique solution.
Remark 4.1. The NEP(Θν , Xν)IIν=I has a nonempty, compact solution set when function F̂ is
coercive or X is bounded.
5 The Multi-Leader-Follower Game in Deregulated Electricity Market
Privatization and restructuring of the edregulated electricity markets have taken place in
many countries, although an excessive free market also has a possibility to bring about some
trouble. Under this situation, a lot of researchers have paid much attention to the noncooper-
ative competition problems in this area, see [5, 10, 19]. In this section, we present a simple
model of competitive bidding under some macroeconomic regulation. We will show that it
can be formulated as the multi-leader-follower game that we have considered in the previous
sections.
In this model, there are several firms and one market maker, called the ISO, who employs
a market cleaning mechanism to collect the electricity from firms by paying the bid costs,
determine the price of electricity and sell it to consumers. We omit the problem of consumers,
which means any quantity of electricity power can be consumed. The structure of the model can
be described as follows. Again, for simplicity, we assume there are only two firms I and II. The
two firms are competing for market power in an electricity network with M nodes. We assume
that firms I and II produce the electricity with fixed quantities aI and aII, respectively, and send
it to all nodes. A firm receives its profit by dispatching electricity with the bid parameters
to the ISO at each node. Let ρν = (ρν1, · · · , ρνM)T , ν = I, II, denote firm ν’s bid parameter
vectors, where the components ρνi are the bid parameters to nodes i = 1, · · · ,M . The vector
q = (qI, qII) ∈ R2M with qν = (qν1 , · · · , qνM)T , ν = I, II, denotes the quantities supplied by the
firms, or more specifically, qIi and q
II
i denote the quantities of electricity supplied by firm I and
firm II at nodes i = 1, · · · ,M , respectively. Each firm ν will submit a bid function bν(q, ρν)
to the ISO. The function bν represents how much revenue firm ν will receive by selling the




(ρν)Tdiag(ζν1 , · · · , ζνM)ρν , where ζνi , i = 1, · · · ,M, are given positive constants.
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Each firm ν tries to determine its bid parameter vector ρν by minimizing the difference
between its transaction cost and revenue, i.e., by solving the following optimization problem





(ρν)Tdiag(ζν1 , · · · , ζνM)ρν − bν(q, ρν)
subject to 0 ≤ ρνi ≤ ξνi , i = 1, · · · ,M,
where ξνi , i = 1, · · · ,M , are positive empirical upper bounds set by the firm ν, ν = I, II. We
further assume that the firms’ bid functions are given by
bν(q, ρ
ν) ≡ ρν1qν1 + · · ·+ ρνMqνM = −(ρν)TDνq, ν = I, II,
where Dν ∈ RM×2M are bid matrices of firm ν, which are defined by DI = (−I, 0) and
DII = (0,−I), where I is the identity matrix and 0 is the zero matrix. We will write the





−ρν1, · · · , −ρνM , ρν1 − ξν1 , · · · , ρνM − ξνM
)T
.
Remark 5.1. Pang and Fukushima [5] also considered a multi-leader-follower game with an
application in a deregulated electricity market model where the firms are required to bid on
their revenue functions. Here we extend their model by considering the transaction cost in each
leader’s objective function.
Moreover, we assume that some economic interventionism works in this electricity model in
order to maintain some equilibrium between the quantities of electricity at each node from two







)2, i = 1, · · · ,M ,
where aν , ν = I, II, are the quantities of electricity produced by firm I, II, respectively, and
each economic interventionism parameter εi is positive and small. We assume aν , ν = I, II,
are fixed. Under the economic interventionism, the ISO tries to let each firm ν supply the
electricity in such a way that the quantity tends to be proportional to his total amount aν at
each node. At the same time, the ISO employs a market mechanism to determine a set of nodal
prices and electricity quantities from each firm at each node in order to maximize its profit (the
revenue minus the bid costs), or minimize the negative profit. We further assume that, at each
node, the affine demand curves determine the prices pi as a function of the total quantity of





i ) := αi − βi(qIi + qIIi ), i = 1, · · · ,M,
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where αi and βi are given positive constants.
Then the ISO minimizes its negative profit by solving the following optimization problem































qIi − aI = 0,
M∑
i=1
qIIi − aII = 0.

































· · · 0 β1 − ε1aIaII · · · 0
... . . .
...
... . . .
...
0 · · · βM + 2εM(aI)2 0 · · · βM − εMaIaII
β1 − ε1aIaII · · · 0 β1 + 2ε1(aII)2 · · · 0
... . . .
...
... . . .
...












Notice that matrix B is positive definite. Moreover, the constraints of the ISO can be rewritten
as
Aq + a = 0,
where
A =
 1 · · · 1 0 · · · 0
0 · · · 0 1 · · · 1




Therefore, the electricity market model under consideration can be formulated as the fol-
lowing multi-leader-follower game:





(ρI)Tdiag(ζ I1, · · · , ζ IM)ρI + (ρI)TDIq
subject to gI(ρI) ≤ 0.
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(ρII)Tdiag(ζ II1 , · · · , ζ IIM)ρII + (ρII)TDIIq






qTBq + cT q − (ρI)TDIq − (ρII)TDIIq
subject to Aq + a = 0.
In light of the analysis in the previous sections, we can further reformulate the multi-leader-
follower game as the following VI: Find a vector ρ∗ = (ρ∗,I, ρ∗,II) ∈ X = X I × X II such
that
F̂ (ρ∗)T (ρ− ρ∗) ≥ 0 for all ρ ∈ X, (8)
where
ρ = (ρI, ρII) = (ρI1, · · · , ρIM , ρII1 , · · · , ρIIM)T ,
Xν = {ρν : gν(ρν) ≤ 0}, ν = I, II,
gν(ρν) = (−ρν1, · · · ,−ρνM , ρν1 − ξν1 , · · · , ρνM − ξνM)T , ν = I, II,
F̂ (ρ) =
 diag(ζ I1, · · · , ζ IM)ρI +DIr + 2DIGρI +DIHρII
diag(ζ II1 , · · · , ζ IIM)ρII +DIIr +DIIGρI + 2DIIHρII
 .
Remark 5.2. The assumption that the follower’s problem does not contain inequality con-
straints would narrow down the range of applications of the model. In fact, the approach
presented in this paper cannot be extended directly to the inequality constrained case. Never-
theless we may still try to make some further efforts to deal with inequality constraints based





qTBy + cT q − (ρI)TDIq − (ρII)TDIIq
subject to Aq + a = 0, q ≥ 0.
A possible idea to deal with the inequality constraint q ≥ 0 is the following: First, we just ig-
nore it, apply the above-mentioned VI formulation, and find a L/F Nash equilibrium. Next, we
check the components of q in the equilibrium. If they are all nonnegative, then we accept the
current equilibrium as a solution of the problem. Otherwise, we set the negative components
of q to be 0, or in other words, we discard those components. Then we try to find a L/F Nash
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equilibrium of the reduced problem by ignoring the inequality constraint q ≥ 0 again. Repeat-
ing this heuristic procedure, we will eventually obtain an approximate L/F Nash equilibrium of
the original game.
6 Numerical Experiments
In this section, we show numerical results for the electricity market model described in the
previous section.
Note that X in (8) can be represented as X = {ρ ∈ R2M |0 ≤ ρνi ≤ ξνi , i = 1, · · · ,M, ν =
I, II}. Thus the VI is a box-constrained variational inequality (BVI), denoted by BVI(X, F̂ (ρ)).
To solve the BVI, Kanzow and Fukushima [20] present a nonsmooth Newton-type method
applied to the nonlinear equation involving the natural residual of the BVI. The algorithm uses
the D-gap function to ensure global convergence of the Newton-type method. We use the
following parameter setting in the implementation of Algorithm 3.2 in [20]:
α = 0.9, β = 1.2, δ = 0.6, ω = 10−6,
σ = 10−4, p = 2.1, η = 0.8, τ = 10−6.
First we solve a model with two firms I, II, who dispatch the electricity to two nodes i = 1, 2.
We set the problem data as follows:
α1 = 1.5, α2 = 1.8; β1 = 0.6, β2 = 0.7; a
I = 1.2, aII = 1.8;
ξI1 = 1, ξ
I
2 = 1, ξ
II
1 = 1, ξ
II
2 = 1; ζ
I
1 = 1.2; ζ
I
2 = 1, ζ
II
1 = 1.3, ζ
II
2 = 1.5.
We also set the problem data ε = (ε1, ε2) as listed in Table 1, where the corresponding com-














T along with the
objective values of the firms and the ISO are shown.
We may observe from the table that the economic interventionism terms play an important
role in the distribution of electricity quantities at each node. As the economic interventionism
parameters εi, i = 1, 2, become larger, the ratio of electricity quantities supplied by firm I and
firm II gets closer to the ratio of the amount of electricity aI : aII = 1 : 1.5. For example,
when the ε changes from (0.001, 0.001) to (0.05, 0.05), the ratio at two nodes changes from
q∗,I1 : q
∗,II




2 = 1 : 1.4223 to 1 : 1.5938 and 1 : 1.4251, respectively.
Also in this procedure, both firms’ optimal profits are nondecreasing, but the ISO’s profit is
decreasing.
We also solved a larger electricity market model with three firms and five nodes, where the
following problem data are used:
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Table 1. The L/F Nash Equilibrium with Two Firms and Two Nodes
ε (0.001, 0.001) (0.005, 0.005) (0.01, 0.01) (0.05, 0.05)
(0.4139, 0.4137, (0.4142, 0.4135, (0.4146, 0.4132, (0.4173, 0.4113,
ρ∗
0.6429, 0.6428) 0.6430, 0.6427) 0.6432, 0.6426) 0.6440, 0.6419)
valL1 -0.2483 -0.2483 -0.2483 -0.2485
valL2 -0.5786 -0.5786 -0.5786 -0.5786
(0.5331, 0.6669, (0.5330, 0.6670, (0.5330, 0.6670, (0.5327, 0.6673,
q∗
0.8515, 0.9485) 0.8512, 0.9488) 0.8510, 0.9490) 0.8490, 0.9510)
valF -1.8425 -1.8424 -1.8424 -1.8422
Iter 2 2 2 2
Note1. valL1, valL2 and valF denote the optimal values of firm I, firm II and the ISO, respectively, and Iter denotes
the number of iterations.
Table 2. The L/F Nash Equilibrium with Three Firms and Five Nodes
(0.001, 0.001, 0.001, (0.005, 0.005, 0.005, (0.01, 0.01, 0.01, (0.05, 0.05, 0.05,
ε
0.001, 0.001) 0.005, 0.005) 0.01, 0.01) 0.05, 0.05)
(0.1799, 0.1789, (0.1831, 0.1780, (0.1869, 0.177, (0.2125, 0.1700,
0.1788, 0.1791, 0.1776, 0.1790, 0.1762, 0.1789, 0.1667, 0.1781,
0.1791; 0.3296, 0.1790; 0.3327, 0.1788; 0.3364, 0.1778; 0.3620,
0.3285, 0.3285, 0.3277, 0.3273, 0.3267, 0.3259, 0.3197, 0.3165,
ρ∗
0.3287, 0.3288; 0.3285, 0.3287; 0.3283, 0.3286; 0.3266, 0.3282;
0.2440, 0.2430, 0.2469, 0.2421, 0.2505, 0.2411, 0.2744, 0.2339,
0.2429, 0.2432, 0.2418, 0.2432, 0.2404, 0.2431, 0.2309, 0.2428,
0.2432) 0.2431) 0.2430) 0.2421)
valL1 -0.1078 -0.1091 -0.1107 -0.1202
valL2 -0.3952 -0.3978 -0.401 -0.4201
valL3 -0.2224 -0.2244 -0.2268 -0.2414
(0.5334, 0.1327, (0.5317, 0.1334, (0.5296, 0.1341, (0.5154, 0.1394,
0.1511, 0.1837, 0.1516, 0.1841, 0.1521, 0.1845, 0.1559, 0.1875,
0.1990; 1.0716, 0.1993; 1.0668, 0.1996; 1.0610, 0.2018; 1.0217,
0.2572, 0.2886, 0.2590, 0.2905, 0.2612, 0.2927, 0.2756, 0.3079,
q∗
0.4082, 0.3744; 0.4087, 0.3750; 0.4094, 0.3757; 0.4141, 0.3808;
0.8488, 0.1936, 0.8450, 0.1949, 0.8405, 0.1965, 0.8098, 0.2072,
0.2133, 0.2533, 0.2146, 0.2539, 0.2162, 0.2547, 0.2267, 0.2602,
0.2911) 0.2916) 0.2921) 0.2960)
valF -6.4479 -6.4419 -6.4346 -6.3871
Iter 4 23 3 14
Note 2. valL3 denotes the optimal value of firm III.
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α1 = 1.2, α2 = 1.5, α3 = 1.6, α4 = 1.8, α5 = 1.9; a
I = 1.2, aII = 2.4, aIII = 1.8;
β1 = 0.2, β2 = 0.5, β3 = 0.6, β4 = 0.7, β5 = 0.8; ξ
I
1 = 1, ξ
I
2 = 3, ξ
I
3 = 5, ξ
I
4 = 2, ξ
I
5 = 6;
ξII1 = 1, ξ
II
2 = 1, ξ
II
3 = 4, ξ
II
4 = 1.5, ξ
II
5 = 5; ξ
III
1 = 1, ξ
III
2 = 1.7, ξ
III
3 = 1, ξ
III
4 = 1, ξ
III
5 = 2;
ζ I1 = 1.1, ζ
I
2 = 1.4, ζ
I
3 = 1.7, ζ
I
4 = 1.2, ζ
I
5 = 1.3; ζ
II
1 = 1.2, ζ
II
2 = 1.5, ζ
II
3 = 1.8, ζ
II
4 = 1.5,
ζ II5 = 1.3; ζ
III
1 = 1.3, ζ
III
2 = 1.6, ζ
III
3 = 1.9, ζ
III
4 = 1.2, ζ
III
5 = 1.4.
We also set ε = (ε1, ε2, ε3, ε4, ε5) as listed in Table 2, where the corresponding numerical
results are shown. We may also observe similar properties to those for the pervious model from
the table. When the economic interventionism parameters εi, i = 1, · · · , 5, become larger, the
ratio of electricity quantities supplied by firms I , II and III gets closer to the ratio of the amount
of electricity aI : aII : aIII = 1 : 2 : 1.5, and the optimal profit of each firm increases, while that
of the ISO decreases.
7 Conclusions
Considering the difficulties of general multi-leader-follower games, this paper has focused
on a multi-leader-follower game with some particular structure, which contains one follower
whose optimization problem is a strictly convex quadratic program with equality constraints.
Then the multi-leader-follower game is formulated as a NEP, which can further be formulated
as a VI. We have shown the existence and uniqueness of a L/F Nash equilibrium. We have also
presented an application in electricity power markets with some numerical results.
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